We are skilled social mind readers: We can pick up on others' thoughts and intentions through their behavior, subtle or overt (Clark, Schreuder, & Buttrick, 1983; Epley, 2014; Ferguson & Breheny, 2012) . But when the other person chooses to hide their true thoughts, we become very poor mind readers. We often cannot tell whether someone is hiding something from us or is telling the truth: Spotting deception is only marginally above chance rates (Bond & DePaulo, 2006 , 2008 . Can we do better? Over the last 35 years of research, a paradigm known as indirect lie detection has shown that yes we can, if we just rely on our unconscious knowledge (DePaulo, 1994; Granhag, 2006; Granhag & Strömwall, 2004; van 't Veer, Stel, van Beest, & Gallucci, 2014; Vrij, 2004; see DePaulo & Morris, 2004 , for an overview; although see Bond, Levine, & Hartwig, 2014; Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 2001 , who use this method without reference to unconscious processing). We argue that although the indirect method improves accuracy, there is no evidence that unconscious knowledge is in use. We propose an alternative account, the focal account, to explain the accuracy benefit without relying on an ill-defined claim of hidden, inaccessible knowledge. Instead, we draw on the nature of the task, a low-diagnostic multiple-cue judgment task (see DePaulo et al., 2003; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006 , to explain the accuracy difference.
The indirect lie detection paradigm is quite simple. Participants are not told they will watch lies and truths. Instead, they are asked to judge whether a behavior is present or absent, like whether the speaker appears to be thinking hard or not (Vrij et al., 2001 ), tense or not (DePaulo, Rosenthal, Green, & Rosenkrantz, 1982) , and so on. If the rater judges the speaker to be thinking hard, for instance, a lie judgment is recorded by the experimenter. If the speaker is judged not to be thinking hard, a truth judgment is recorded. These converted "indirect" judgments better distinguish liars and truthtellers than explicit judgments of deception (see DePaulo & Morris, 2004) . Traditionally, this accuracy benefit has been seen as a reflection of using some hidden and unconscious knowledge store.
But the traditional implicit knowledge account does not mirror what is known about implicit cognition (Granhag, 2006) . In implicit learning experiments participants perform better than they expect and are underconfident, whereas in lie detection experiments, participants perform worse than they expect and are overconfident (DePaulo, Charlton, Cooper, Lindsay, & Muhlenbruck, 1997; Elaad, 2003; Granhag, 2006) . Consider also that lie detectors are more accurate when they are conscious of their judgment strategy, compared to when they rely on "gut feeling" (Porter, Woodworth, & Birt, 2000) .
However, there is a far more difficult problem for any unconscious knowledge claim: Raters can distinguish liars and truthtellers with some degree of accuracy in this task without having any knowledge about the clues to deception, whether conscious or unconscious. First, we will explain how that is possible and then build our new account of indirect deception detection that makes no reference to unconscious knowledge: the focal account.
Unwitting Lie Detection
The indirect lie detection task, from the participants' point of view, is to separate out those who are thinking hard from those who are not. They are not told about the possibility of judging deception (although see Mann & Vrij, 2006; and Ulatowska, 2013 , for notable exceptions), and so should not be not trying to separate out liars and truth-tellers. After they place all the speakers who are thinking hard in one pile and all those who do not appear to be thinking hard in another pile, will we find more liars in one pile and more truth-tellers in the other? The answer is this: It depends on whether appearing to be thinking hard correlates with deception (i.e., whether it is diagnostic of deception). The stronger the correlation between thinking hard and lying, the more we should find liars in the "thinking hard" pile, even if the participant has no understanding of what it means to deceive. In short, the findings of the indirect lie detection studies do not show evidence of unconscious thinking: They only show that the cue being rated in those studies is a diagnostic cue of deception. Because the task can be completed without any knowledge or experience of deception, it seems to tell us nothing of the conscious or unconscious knowledge of deceptive cues.
The Focal Account Poor Direct Lie Detection
We have argued that the results of the indirect deception task can be explained if the cue that participants are told to focus on is, in fact, diagnostic of deception. In this case, lie detection accuracy does increase, albeit indirectly. This raises the question, "Why are people relatively inaccurate lie detectors when there is the potential to perform better?"
We put forward a new explanation of the poor accuracy, which we call the focal account. Very simply, the account argues that lie detectors perform poorly because the multiple diagnostic "leakage" cues taken into account (such as whether the speaker is thinking hard, appears tense, is delivering a plausible tale, and so on) are only probabilistic (DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006 , and most of the available behaviors are "self-presentational" cues that are intended to make the liar appear as though they are telling the truth (DePaulo et al., 2003) . Because of this, a speaker may appear tense, which suggests the speaker is lying (DePaulo et al., 2003) , but they may also actively control their appearance so that they do not appear to be having to think hard, which suggests the speaker is telling the truth (Vrij et al., 2001) . That is, cues can suggest competing interpretations. Which cue should be trusted? This is the key problem that we claim explicit lie detectors face, and it is this that limits their potential accuracy.
The first signs of our underlying assumptions are becoming apparent: The account proposes people necessarily integrate the cues, rather than selecting one over the other. The research shows that people do combine the multiple cues available when evaluating which of two choices is the best to make (Bröder, 2000; Bröder & Eichler, 2006; Newell & Fernandez, 2006; , 2004 Newell, Weston, & Shanks, 2003; Pohl, 2006; Richter & Späth, 2006) , and so people must tackle this conflict between cues to come to a judgment. However, we should note that some research shows people do not integrate cues, but rather just select one or the other to make their judgment (e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; see Pohl, 2011 , for a review of the debate).
The conflict during cue integration is the source of error, according to the focal account, and it reduces direct lie detection accuracy. Because self-presentational (actively misleading) cues are thought to dominate a liar's behavior, and because leakage cues are, by definition, rare or perhaps even nonexistent (see Levine, 2014) , integrating more cues into the judgment means integrating more misleading cues that will contradict the diagnostic information available in the leakage cues. However, as we will show, conflict between cues can reduce accuracy even when both cues under focus are diagnostic. By reducing attention to a single cue, the potential for conflict between the attended cues is removed because now there is only a single cue in use. Accuracy should then be determined by the diagnosticity of the cue in use.
Why Cue Combination Does Not (Necessarily) Improve Accuracy
To assess IQ, it would be foolish to use only a single item. Using a conjunction of items can improve the reliability of the IQ scale. So why would one advocate the use of a single cue for improving lie detection?
Consider the existence of a single item on an IQ test that predicts intelligence perfectly. In this situation, incorporating less precise measures into the calculation of the IQ score would only serve to reduce the accuracy of the test. It would be better to ignore those low-diagnostic indicators, because sometimes they will contradict the results from the perfectly diagnostic measures in the test and so lead to error. The same would hold true in the case of lie detection. Of course, it is unlikely that there will be a single perfect predictor of IQ or deception. Making the example a little more realistic, consider an IQ item that is 75% likely to give the true IQ score of a given individual. If there is a second item that is 60% diagnostic, should that be added into the scale?
If the scale's accuracy was defined by the simple joint probability (in the same way that we suggest lie detectors do to integrate cues), then no, because the accuracy would be the average of the two items, at 67.5% accuracy. But psychometric test theory allows for the combination of both items to improve the accuracy of the scale. The reason for this is that it does not simply count the occasions where the cues are jointly diagnostic. Rather, a statistical procedure explicitly factors out both the long run standard error of each score and the long run correlation between the error scores.
Psychometric test theory is the result of work by statisticians such as Charles Spearman and is a field of statistics research that continues to be worked on. Such statistical sophistication is unlikely to underlie judgment formation (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) . Constructing an IQ test requires sampling many people over multiple questions. From this, a reliability score of each item can be achieved, and the cues can be combined in a statistically sophisticated manner. The intention here is not to explain the fundamentals of psychometric test theory. We wish only to show that accuracy can be improved from multiple probabilistic cues, but this is not a simple combination of the cues. It requires the This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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STREET AND RICHARDSON development of a complex analytical framework as well as a representative sample of data points in order to allow for highly accurate information to be obtained from probabilistic cues. Because this statistical technique requires a long-run sample of data, coupled with sophisticated techniques for combining the information based on the correlation and standard error of each cue, it may be that such strategies are beyond the capabilities of lie detectors (see Brunswik, 1952; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Simon, 1990) . At least, the focal account assumes this much because it serves as a useful starting point for developing the account.
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Aside from statistical complexity, there is another difference between scale construction and lie detection. When constructing a scale, items that have low diagnosticity are usually removed because they contribute more noise than useful information. If lie detectors want to remove noise from their judgment, they would need to identify the low diagnostic cues and be sure not to use them in their judgment. Unfortunately, most, if not all, cues have low diagnosticity (DePaulo et al., 2003) .
Relatedly, all the items on a scale contribute positively to identifying the construct of interest, IQ, say. Put another way, each "cue" or item on the scale is an indicator of the true underlying value of IQ, with some noise. Those items that do not load onto the IQ construct are removed. But the situation is quite different for a lie detector. From meta-analyses, it would seem that the majority of the behaviors that a speaker produces are not diagnostic of deception or honesty (DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006 . Indeed, some have suggested that most people do not produce any cues that are diagnostic of deception (Levine, 2014) . Thus, many of the cues are useless. But worse than this, the liar will try to produce cues that give the appearance of being honest (DePaulo et al., 2003) . These cues actively detract from making the correct judgment. So as one introduces more cues into the judgment, so too does one introduce cues that load onto the wrong underlying value. This is simply not the case when we construct scales: Those that actively detract from making a valid prediction of IQ are removed or, more likely, are not even included in the scale when we first construct it. Thus, in the case of deception detection, it can be useful to ignore information because much of it may be either nondiagnostic or, worse still, actively misleading.
In short, the construction of scales differs from lie detection in at least two important ways. First, scale construction benefits from advanced statistical techniques that allow inferences based on a sufficiently large sample of data, while an optimistic interpretation of human decision making would be to conclude that they use smart but simplified rules and principles that overcomes the limits of their cognitive resources (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Simon, 1990 ; see also Street, 2015 , for a similar argument in the field of lie detection). Second, scale construction purposely avoids incorporating nondiagnostic cues because it adds noise to the measure, and incorporating an item on the scale that actively reduces the accuracy of the scale would be foolhardy. But the lie detector, we propose, does not have the luxury of singling out those cues that are reliable indicators of honesty from those which are only being shown as an attempt to mimic honesty-a plausible story may correctly indicate honesty in some statements, but in other statements, it may mislead us into thinking the speaker is being honest when in fact they are not. According to the focal account, dealing with this uncertainty-that is, determining whether a long-run low-diagnostic cue indicates honesty or deception on this particular occasion-is the difficulty lie detectors ordinarily face. Accuracy can be "artificially" boosted by focusing attention only to those behaviors that are known to be reliable indicators in the long run. This, we suggest, is the key to explaining why the indirect lie detection method seems to improve accuracy.
But this is not quite enough in itself to ensure the best accuracy rate possible. We next look at a worked example to show that even when the rater is focused on only the reliable indicators accuracy can still be lower than what should be possible.
Cue Combination: A Worked Example
Imagine that the leakage cue "appears to be thinking hard" (TH) is diagnostic of deception and honesty on 75% of occasions (Figure 1) . Also imagine that a second cue "appears tense" (TE) has an overall diagnosticity of 60%.
2 Assuming only those two cues are used, the error propagates such that the presence/absence of the two cues indicate deception/honesty (and so are jointly diagnostic) with 45% diagnosticity in the long run (a probability of 0.75 [TH] ϫ 0.60 [TE] ϭ 0.45). That is, it will only be clear on 45% of occasions whether the speaker is lying or telling the truth because the two cues perfectly correlate on these occasions: No matter which cue is used, or if both cues are combined, the outcome will be the same. However, on the remaining 55% of trials either one (45% of occasions:
will incorrectly suggest the speaker is telling the truththey are uncorrelated. Assuming unbiased guessing on the situations where the two cues contradict, overall accuracy would reach (.45 (complementary items) ϩ (.45/2; half of the contradictory items) ϭ .675) 67.5%, even though there is the potential to achieve 75% accuracy using a single cue. Combining probabilistic cues also combines the prediction error of the two cues, and can result in lower accuracy. If only the most diagnostic cue was used throughout and the lower diagnostic cues were ignored, raters could potentially achieve an accuracy of 75%. But by combining probabilistic cues, long-run accuracy decreases because of a propagation of error that reduces their joint diagnosticity.
Superior Indirect Lie Detection
The focal account explains not only why direct lie detectors perform poorly, but also how (and under what conditions) indirect lie detectors perform more accurately. If explicit lie-truth judgments are inaccurate because of cue conflict, why does the same not hold for indirect judgments? The reason is that the indirect lie detection method makes participants use a single cue by asking 1 Of course, challenges to assumptions of the account would offer falsification. By making assumptions such as this, the account aims to be out in front of the data, allowing it to make testable predictions.
2 For the moment, let us say the two cues are independent. This example is hypothetical and intended to be a demonstration and proof of principle. If the two cues are perfectly related then one cue is redundant and accuracy is identical to using a single cue. We are not proposing that the cues people use are actually 75% diagnostic, although it is not unheard of to have such highly diagnostic cues available (e.g., Blair, Levine, & Shaw, 2010; Bond, Howard, Hutchison, & Masip, 2013; Levine, Blair, & Clare, 2014) . This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
3 THE FOCAL ACCOUNT raters to attend to and judge only one cue (e.g., "Is this person thinking hard or not?"). Raters need only attend to the cue they are asked to make judgments of, whereas explicit lie detectors take a variety of cues into account such as whether the speaker's statement appears inconsistent (Granhag & Strömwall, 2001; Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Street & Masip, 2015) , how uncertain the speaker seems (Hartwig & Bond, 2011) , whether their face is pleasant (Hartwig & Bond, 2011) , and whether the speaker is thinking hard (Hartwig & Bond, 2011; Vrij et al., 2001 ). This allows indirect raters the potential to reach that 75% accuracy. The focal account goes beyond considering the joint diagnosticity of probabilistic cues. It makes the stronger prediction that those behaviors which are most salient to people (in the case of indirect lie detection, by focusing attention to them) are the ones that influence the judgment most heavily. In the case of indirect lie detection, there is only a single cue in focus, whereas direct lie detection requires attention to multiple cues.
There is much research showing the effect of cue focusing on judgments (Blair, 2006; Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Hill, Memon, & McGeorge, 2008; Kelley, 1950; Masip, Alonso, Garrido, & Herrero, 2009; Moore, Neal, Fitzsimons, & Shiv, 2012) . For instance, when people are trained to detect lies, they show a bias toward judging statements as lies (Blair, 2006; Masip et al., 2009 ), but when trained to detect truths they show a bias toward judgment statements as truths (Masip et al., 2009 ). Attending to a particular cue influences peoples' perception of the speaker's intent, as though viewing the speaker through the lens of that particular focal cue.
This focusing is claimed to influence lie detection accuracy. If people focus only on perfectly diagnostic cues they should perform with perfect accuracy or thereabouts (the analogue to indirect lie detection). But if there are also other salient nondiagnostic cues available they should be integrated into the judgment and in turn actually reduce accuracy (the analogue of direct lie detection). A recent study found just this (Bond et al., 2013) . Participants were incentivized to lie or tell the truth: They were rewarded with a payment for, say, lying, or would have to watch a clock for 15 min in silence without payment if instead they told the truth. This incentive was perfectly diagnostic: everyone unsurprisingly chose the payment over watching the seconds tick by. When explicit lie detectors are given a cue that predicts deception and honesty 100% of the time (the incentives offered to the speaker to lie or tell the truth), they achieve near perfect accuracy, even without being told that the cue is perfectly diagnostic. So people can detect deception when making explicit lie-truth judgments, given that they have a perfectly diagnostic cue available to them. But when, in addition to this cue, they are also given other lower diagnostic cues (the speaker's statement), accuracy drops. Similarly, Duffy and Feltovich (2006) found that in economic games people achieve better outcomes when the two cues work together than when the cues contradict each other.
The addition of lower diagnostic information actually served to reduce accuracy, even though the perfectly diagnostic cue was available (Masip et al., 2009; see Nisbett, Zukier, & Lemley, 1981 , for a similar exposition). By incorporating probabilistic (lower diagnostic) cues into the judgment, accuracy could only decrease from the level of what could be achieved from using the single (perfectly diagnostic) cue. Nonetheless, available cues are integrated into the decision, even when they would be better off disregarding it (Duffy & Feltovich, 2006; Hall, Ariss, & Todorov, 2007; Platzer & Bröder, 2012 ; see also Glöckner & Bröder, 2011; Hilbig, 2008) .
A brief summary of the account: Indirect lie detectors are showing us how well explicit detectors could perform. Indirect detectors perform well because they focus on a single, diagnostic cue. The focal account argues direct detectors do not reach this level of accuracy because they attend to more than a single cue to deception. The probabilistic nature of the cues means that they can conflict: on any single occasion, some cues may suggest honesty others deception. The competition between multiple probabilistic cues leads to a dilemma: Should a lie or truth judgment be made? This source of noise, it is argued, reduces direct lie detection accuracy.
Assumptions and Predictions
There are at least three claims that must be true for the focal account to hold. First, the cues used in indirect lie detection studies Figure 1 . A depiction of the worked example, with one cue being 75% diagnostic and another being 60% diagnostic. Both cues are jointly present and indicate the correct judgment 45% of the time (A). On another 45% of the trials only one of the two cues suggests the correct judgment (B), and on 10% of the trials both cues indicate the incorrect judgment (C). Multiply the solid lines together and add this to the product of the dashed lines where applicable to obtain the resulting percentage value shown on the right of the diagram. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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STREET AND RICHARDSON must be diagnostic of deception. To our knowledge, in past experiments where indirect detection improves accuracy the cue selected for rating always holds some diagnostic validity. For instance, Vrij et al. (2001) showed that liars exhibited behaviors indicative of cognitive difficulty, giving some diagnostic value to the "thinking hard" cue, and DePaulo et al. (2003) found that liars are more tense than truth-tellers. Both of these cues have been used in studies using the indirect lie detection method (DePaulo et al., 1982; Vrij et al., 2001) . If the cue being rated is nondiagnostic, the indirect judgments should not outperform direct judgments. This is an important claim because it suggests not all indirect lie detection studies will show accuracy benefits. Indeed, often there are not accuracy benefits (Bond, Levine, & Hartwig, 2014; Klaver, Lee, Spidel, & Hart, 2009 ). Second, it must be possible for raters to detect the cue they have been asked to rate. Returning to the thinking hard example, research shows raters can indeed perceive when people are thinking hard (Mann & Vrij, 2006; Vrij et al., 2001 ; see also Cahill, Fisher, & Rivard, 2011; Hartwig & Bond, 2011) . By being able to determine when the behavior is present, and because this behavior correlates with the presence of deceit, raters can come to appear as though they are detecting deception without any explicit awareness: The behavioral cue acts as a mediator to allow an individual to appear as though they are spotting liars.
Third, the more novel aspect of our account, the cue must either be the only information taken into account when making the judgment, or at least have a heavier weighting relative to the other cues being considered. Making particular cues salient does seem to lead to decisions being swayed by that cue (Cherubini, Mazzocco, & Rumiati, 2003; Higgins et al., 1977; Legrenzi, Girotto, & Johnson-Laird, 1993; Masip et al., 2009; Platzer & Bröder, 2012) . Experiment 2 explicitly assesses this assumption.
The account specifies the conditions that should cause poor indirect detection performance: When raters attend to multiple conflicting cues, as per a direct detector (see Poor Direct Lie Detection section). Importantly, the implicit knowledge account claims that it is the method of making judgments indirectly that improves accuracy, regardless of whether people are rating how tense the person is (DePaulo et al., 1982) , how hard they are thinking (Vrij et al., 2001) , how ambivalent they are (DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979) , and so on. The cues themselves are unimportant: Simply using the indirect method of detection should boost accuracy. Cue contradiction should not influence accuracy: People can bring their unconscious knowledge to bear on whatever cues are available. If the focal account is true, cue contradiction should predict accuracy. But if the implicit knowledge account is true, there should be no effect of cue contradiction. Put another way, the problems associated with explicit detection (low diagnostic cues conflicting on any given occasion) will also hamper indirect lie detection, despite still being able to use their unconscious knowledge. This is tested in Experiment 1.
As well as proposing novel conditions that make the indirect lie detection method fail, the account also makes claims about the conditions that guide explicit lie-truth judgments. If indirect lie detectors perform well because they attend to a single cue, this effect should be possible to extend to direct lie detectors. It is proposed that they will be more heavily swayed by a single cue if they attend to that cue. We test this in Experiment 2. If supported, the focal account can explain both direct and indirect judgments under the same conceptual umbrella: The problems of explicit lie detection can also hamper indirect detection (Experiment 1), and the benefits of indirect lie detection can influence explicit lie-truth judgments (Experiment 2). In both cases, if unconscious processing brings something unique and inaccessible to conscious processing, our manipulations should fail for the reasons just stated.
Experiment 1a
The purpose of Experiments 1a and 1b is to show that accuracy in indirect lie detection studies can be explained as a reduction of attention to a single, diagnostic cue. In Experiment 1b, we examine how the disparity between the ratings of two cues can reduce correct classification rate. To do so, participants make a scaled judgment of how hard a speaker appears to be thinking (TH) and how tense (TE) the speaker appears to be on a scale of 1 to 10. But the indirect lie detection method usually has participants make a binary response: Is the person thinking hard or not? Is he or she tense or not? These are then relabeled as lie and truth judgments, as explained in the introduction. The purpose of this first experiment is to determine at what point on our scale we can draw a boundary such that those ratings below the boundary are indicative of "not thinking hard" or "not tense" judgments, while those above the boundary are indicative of "thinking hard" or "tense" judgments.
The midpoint of this scale might be an appropriate place to draw a boundary to turn our continuous scale into a binary judgment, and thence into an indirect lie or truth judgment. But it may be that, say, people only make a "thinking hard" categorical judgment when the speaker is showing very clear signs that they are thinking hard. In that case, it might be more appropriate to draw a boundary at a higher value so that participants are more conservative in making "thinking hard" than "not thinking hard" judgments. A classification tree is used to determine the most appropriate boundary.
Method
Participants. Thirty-seven students (31 female) from a Canadian university took part as raters. They had a mean age of 22.89 years (SD ϭ 4.45, range 18 -41).
Stimulus collection. We used the Bloomsbury Deception Set (Street et al., 2011) . Speakers were approached by a research assistant on the street and asked them to take part in a travel and tourism documentary-they were unaware that they would be taking part in an experiment. The assistant explained he was short of time and needed to collect as many accounts of people's experiences in different countries as possible. As a favor to the assistant, 22 people agreed to take part and deliver one honest and one deceptive account. That is, they agreed to lie to help out the assistant. Not everyone that was approached agreed to help out the assistant, but most did.
They were then taken to a hired filming studio and were left alone with a director. The director explained that he was also a researcher interested in people's experiences of the culture and the people in different countries, and stressed the importance of obtaining true accounts for his research. Speakers then signed a waiver stating they would only deliver honest accounts. Two people confessed to the director that they were asked to lie at this This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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THE FOCAL ACCOUNT point, and so did not continue through the experiment. The remaining 20 then delivered one honest and one deceptive account, order counterbalanced by the research assistant. Retrospective consent was obtained. Full details of the Bloomsbury Deception Set can be found in . From these recordings, two video sets were created so that each set contained only one statement from each speaker (either a truth or lie). Two speakers' statements were selected as practice stimuli, leaving 18 speakers for experimental trials. Each experimental set had nine lies and nine truths. We tried to arrange the stimulus sets so that half of the truthful and half of the deceptive statements were of the first statement delivered by the speaker. These experimental trials are used in Experiments 1a and 1b.
Procedure. Participants were seated in isolation at approximately 70 cm from a computer monitor. They were told that the experiment aimed to understand how individuals make judgments of others. Our intention was to provide as little information about the true nature of the study as possible. A practice video was presented, after which half of the participants first provided a rating of how tense the speaker appeared on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 10 (very), followed by a rating of how hard the speaker appeared to be thinking on the same scale. The other half of participants rated the same two indicators in reverse order. After the scaled judgment, a binary judgment was obtained for both cues. They rated the speaker as either thinking hard or not and then tense or not (or in reverse order, counterbalanced). So, in total, participants made four judgments after each statement-two continuously scaled and two binary. Video set A or B was selected for every alternate participant, with each statement within the video set presented in random order.
Response classification. Ratings of tenseness and of ease of thinking were made on a scale of 1 to 10. For each of the 36 statements, the difference between the TE rating and the TH rating was calculated. Without a median split, the data are not easily amenable to F tests. Because there are a number of problems with median splits, generalized logistic mixed-effects models (GLMEMs) with random intercepts modeled for participant and stimulus were used to maintain the continuous nature of the difference score. A simple model without the variable of interest (difference score) is compared to a complex model including the variable.
This classification only determines the degree of complement between behavioral indicators, but not whether the statement was indirectly rated as a lie or truth. The purpose of Experiment 1a was to determine at what point on the scale participants would switch from making a "thinking hard" or "tense" judgment to a "not thinking hard" or "not tense" judgment.
To determine the indirect judgment in our case, the pair of ratings for each statement was summed.
3 Summed values below or at the boundary indicated a low rating of TE and/or a low rating of TH, and so were classified as truth judgments. Those rated above the classification boundary were classified as lie judgments.
Results and Discussion
On the categorical judgment there was a bias toward judging people as not thinking hard (M ϭ .65, SD ϭ .48) and not tense (M ϭ .42, SD ϭ .49). On the scaled judgment from 1 to 10, there was a similar bias for judging people as not thinking hard (M ϭ 4.43, SD ϭ 2.35) and not tense (M ϭ 4.51, SD ϭ 2.38). The differences between the ratings were not statistically different, t(36) ϭ Ϫ0.75, p ϭ .451, d ϭ 0.03, and there were strong positive correlations between the scaled and categorical judgments (TH: r ϭ .80, p Ͻ .001; TE: r ϭ 83, p Ͻ .001). Additionally, the scaled judgments of TH and TE positively correlated at r ϭ .456, p Ͻ .001. The binary TH and TE judgments also positively correlated, r ϭ .236, p Ͻ .001.
Two C4.5 decision trees were built (see Quinlan, 1993) , one for the TH and another for the TE cues. The trees were pruned with a confidence factor of 0.25. A single branching on the scaled variable was made in order to predict the binary judgment. The decision tree will draw a single boundary along the continuous variable, with values above that boundary being demarcated as "thinking hard" or "tense," and values below that boundary as "not thinking hard" or "not tense." Tenfold cross-validation was used to ensure the reliability of the branching.
For the TH cue, the boundary was drawn at 5.00 on the scale. This gave a correct classification rate of 95% ( ϭ 89%). Values of less than or equal to 5.00 were categorized as "not thinking hard," incorrectly classifying 17 of 437 judgments, while values above 5.00 were categorized as "thinking hard," incorrectly classifying 15 of 229 judgments. The same classification boundary was found for the TE scaled judgment, which also correctly classified 95% ( ϭ 89%) of the categorical judgments. Values below or equal to 5.00 were categorized as "not tense," incorrectly classifying 28 of 409 judgments, while values above this were categorized as "tense," incorrectly classifying 5 of 257 judgments.
To recap, the means and standard deviations of the scaled TH and TE judgments are remarkably similar, and are close to but not at the scale center. The best categorizing of the scaled judgments were slightly above the means but slightly below the scale midpoints, at 5.00. This value will be used to categorize the scaled judgments in the next section, so that "not tense" and "not thinking hard" judgments (i.e., values below or equal to 5) were relabeled as truth judgments and all other values as lie judgments, just as the indirect lie detection literature recategorizes the two categories into lie-truth judgments.
In summary, classification trees were used to convert the scaled TE and TH values into categorical TE and TH values. The amount of competition between the two cues predicted the joint ability of the cues to distinguish between lies and truths, with complementary cues improving accuracy.
Experiment 1b
By introducing multiple probabilistic cues, accuracy should decrease according to the focal account. This is because the joint diagnosticity of the two cues is reduced due to a propagation of error discussed earlier-conflict between cues leads to a judgment dilemma. The propagation means there will be more occasions where the two cues compete and suggest the speaker is both lying and telling the truth. Supporting this prediction, a previous study 3 The cue contradiction value and the summed classification value are independent. By way of demonstration, a rating of 2 for TE and 10 for TH gives a large disparity value (8) with a summed value of 12 (lie judgment). Ratings of 3 and 9, 4 and 8, and so on will also sum to 12 (same judgment value), but will have different disparity values. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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STREET AND RICHARDSON using a cheap talk game (a game where people's claims do not necessarily match their actions) found accuracy is greatest when the cues being used in the judgment are aligned and complement one another compared to when they suggest conflicting interpretations (Duffy & Feltovich, 2006 ; see also Bond et al., 2013) . It is only the change in perceptions of the speaker's behavior (being tense or not and thinking hard or not) that is predicted to cause a change in accuracy. Indirect raters in our study are not prevented from using the full behavioral repertoire in making their judgment. Indirect raters are free to use their implicit knowledge about any or all of the cues shown in the statement-not just those being rated, but others like plausibility and so on.
This study uses the same indirect lie detection methodology that has been cited as a way of accessing implicit knowledge. By employing the same method, the implicit knowledge account makes no predictions about accuracy being dependent on the cues being aligned. It is not the particular cue or cues that improve accuracy, but rather the method of indirectly making judgments.
Method
Participants, materials, design, and procedure. Twenty-eight psychology undergraduate students from a London university (19 female, age M ϭ 20.68, SD ϭ 2.97, range 18 to 32 years) participated for course credit. All participants indicated at the point of debrief that they had not received any training or attended any courses on detecting deception.
The stimulus set from Experiment 1a was used here. The procedure follows that of Experiment 1a with the exception that participants did not make a binary response in the current study: They only made the two scaled judgments after each video, one for a rating of the TE cue and another for the TH cue. The rated statements were either truthful or deceptive. Accuracy, measured as the proportion of correct judgments, was taken as the dependent variable. As in Experiment 1a, the summed TE and TH scores give a value between 2 and 20.
Data and response classification. The purpose of Experiment 1a was to determine where to draw the classification boundary for categorizing the scaled response. Here, we analyze the scaled TH and TE judgments collected in that experiment alongside the data collected from the additional 28 participants. As a reminder, the TH and TE cues were summed, and those above the classification boundary of 10 were classified as "tense" and "thinking hard," and so converted to lie judgments. Those values of 10 or below were converted to truth judgments.
Results
As predicted, the correct classification rate was greater when the two cues were more closely aligned with each other. As a reminder, the TH (M ϭ 4.61, SD ϭ 2.28) and TE cues (M ϭ 4.56, SD ϭ 2.30) were summed (M summed ϭ 9.17, SD ϭ 1.78). These cues correlated with r ϭ .41, p Ͻ .001. The boundary of 10.0 found in Experiment 1a was used to categories these continuous ratings as either "lie" (thinking hard, tense) or "truth" judgments (not thinking hard, not tense). This resulted in a mean correct classification rate of .63 (SD ϭ .48).
To determine whether the size of the disparity between the two cue ratings (M ϭ 1.78, SD ϭ 1.65) influenced the degree of correct classification rate, two GLMEMs with random intercepts for participants and stimuli were compared, one with and one without the main effect of cue disparity. The model comparison found differences between the ratings of the two cues were inversely proportional to accuracy, B ϭ Ϫ0.12, 2 (1) ϭ 376.3, p Ͻ .001.
4

Discussion
The focal account proposes indirect lie detection can be explained as a correlation between (a) an attended cue with (b) actual veracity, without the need to assume an implicit cognitive component linking the two. We argue the rater need not make use of implicit knowledge that they do not know how to access consciously (cf. DePaulo, 1994) . We suggest instead that the increased accuracy associated with indirect lie detection arises from the fact that raters' attention is guided toward a small set of relatively diagnostic cues, thereby reducing the potential for conflict between cues on any single occasion, where one can suggest a particular judgment and the other directly conflicts with it.
The current experiment considered whether conflict (or lack thereof) between the cues being attended was sufficient to result in accuracy differences. As predicted, when the cues the raters were directed toward showed conflict there was a marked decrease in accuracy. That is, despite making use of the indirect lie detection method that has previously been used to suggest evidence of additional implicit knowledge, and despite providing raters with the speakers' full set of audiovisual behavior, the correct classification rate was dependent on the potential conflict between the cues that were being considered for their rating.
The beta value is actually quite small, suggesting accuracy comparable with explicit lie detection accuracy- Figure 2 illustrates this quite well. Why is it so low? First, it should be noted that when the cues are complementary, the accuracy is rather high, approximately 70%. This is fairly impressive compared to the often-observed 54% accuracy of explicit lie detectors. It is only as the cues come to contradict one another that accuracy begins to drop. This is consistent with the focal account. The account claims that the indirect lie detection method does not guarantee accuracy rates higher than explicit lie detection. In fact, indirect classification accuracy (or "correct classification rate") can and has been found to be worse than making explicit lie-truth judgments . The focal account proposes the accuracy rate is a function of the diagnosticity of the cue being used to make the judgment. If the cue has low diagnosticity, the correct classification rate will be low. Thus accuracy rates should depend upon the type of stimulus set used if the focal account is true.
One prediction of our account has so far been upheld: the lack of cue conflict can predict accuracy gains. This is the problem in explicit lie-truth judgments, according to the focal account. Here we show that the indirect judgments also suffer when the same issue faces indirect judgments. Experiment 2 reverses the situation by asking whether the benefits of indirect judgments, that is, focusing on a single diagnostic cue, can be applied to explicit 4 In an initial incarnation of this article, the midpoint of the scale (11) was used as the classification boundary rather than the decision tree boundary. Those results tell the same story: The correct classification rate decreases as the cue conflict increases. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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THE FOCAL ACCOUNT judgments. The focal account claims attending to a cue will lead to that cue having a heavier weighting in the judgment. The account predicts that attending to a diagnostic cue improves accuracy even in the presence of nondiagnostic cues. This claim requires an assumption that attending to a cue (diagnostic or not) results in judgments that are more heavily guided by that cue. Put another way, a focused cue that is highly diagnostic will lead to high classification rates, while a focused cue that suggests honesty will lead to a bias toward making truth judgments. But if a person focuses on a different cue in the same statement that suggests deception rather than honesty, this will lead to relatively few truth judgments. This assumption is tested in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
As a demonstration of the effect of attentional focusing, Kelley (1950) introduced his students to a male guest lecturer. Half of the students received a note describing him as being "rather warm." After interacting with the guest lecturer (actually a confederate), participants rated him on various personality traits. These participants gave an overall positive rating of the guest lecturer's personality. The other half of the participants were told the guest lecturer was "rather cold" before they met him. In contrast with participants receiving the "warm" description, these participants later gave a more negative rating of the guest lecturer's personality (see also Widmeyer & Loy, 1988) . Being made aware of some information beforehand can make related knowledge constructs more readily accessible (Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983; Masip et al., 2009 ; although see Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990 , Study 2, for evidence that forewarning can be ineffective), and can have greater influence on the judgment forming process (Higgins et al., 1977; Moore et al., 2012) . For instance, raters are more likely to interpret ambiguous information ("Only rarely did he change his mind even when it might well have been better if he had") as either persistent or stubborn depending on which of the two categories was primed (Higgins et al., 1977) . By making individual features of the problem salient, those features bear more heavily in the judgment process than other available information (Platzer & Bröder, 2012) . Even nondiagnostic information is integrated into the decision (Dana, Dawes, & Peterson, 2013; Nisbett et al., 1981; Ruscio, 2000 ; see also Bond et al., 2013) , particularly when it is salient (Platzer & Bröder, 2012) .
In line with this reasoning, we predicted that attending to a given cue would lead to judgments in terms of that cue. Indirect lie detection studies take this to an extreme: The cue made salient is potentially the only cue under consideration.
From Experiment 1, we selected half of the videos that were rated to have the largest difference score between the two cues. We used those videos classified as displaying conflicting cues precisely because the two rated cues did not align. In accord with research showing salient cues can have a greater weighting in the judgment, and in line with our focal account, we predicted a speaker would be more likely to be considered truthful if raters were made to attend to a cue suggesting honesty (e.g., a low rating in Experiment 1 for the TH cue). However, if made to focus on a cue suggesting deceit in the very same statement (e.g., a high rating in Experiment 1 for the TE cue), raters would be more likely to consider the speaker to be deceptive.
Method
Participants. Sixty-two participants from a London university (35 females, age M ϭ 21.00, SD ϭ 5.93, range 18 to 56 years) received course credit or £3 payment. All participants indicated they had not previously taken part in a lie detection experiment. None of the participants had taken part in Experiment 1.
Materials. A subset of the stimuli was selected from the Bloomsbury Deception Set used in Experiment 1. We selected the one half of the stimulus set (18 statements) rated in Experiment 1 as having the largest difference in the ratings of the two cues. This allowed us to conduct a diagnostic test of the focal account: Focusing on each cue should guide judgments in that direction. From those, 12 speakers were randomly selected such that six of the speakers received a higher rating on the tense cue than on the thinking cue, and six a higher rating on the thinking hard cue. There were six lies and six truths, equally split between those stimuli where the tense cue was rated higher and those where the thinking hard cue was rated higher. We chose to use only 12 rather than all 18 so that there were equal numbers of stimuli in each cell of the Veracity (a lie or truth) ϫ Value of Focal Cue (rated as higher or lower than unfocused cue) design.
Procedure. Participants were tested in isolation. They were informed that they would have two separate tasks. First, they were to make a rating of either how hard the speaker was thinking or how tense they appeared. The one cue to be rated (TE, TH) was randomly selected on each trial. The rating of this cue was made continuously across the statement. At the start of each trial participants were told which cue they would need to rate, and to use the left (not tense/not thinking hard) and right (appears tense/appears to be thinking hard) arrow keys to make this judgment. As the speaker delivered the statement, they were to hold down one of these keys for as long as they held that belief. If they changed their This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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STREET AND RICHARDSON mind at any point they were to indicate this by releasing the key they were holding and begin pressing the other key. We did not record these judgments; they were intended solely to make participants attend to the selected behavior across the course of the statement. At the end of each clip, their second task was to make a lie-truth judgment, as in a typical direct lie detection task. Two practice videos were presented. By the end of the second practice video, all participants indicated they understood how they should make their ratings. The instructions were then presented again on screen for participants to read through a second time if they wished, followed by the 12 experimental trials.
Design. A within-subjects design was employed. In Experiment 1, we obtained ratings for two cues: how hard the speaker appeared to be thinking and how tense the speaker appeared. The focused cue, made salient at the start (by instruction) and throughout the statement (by their own response), was either rated higher or lower than the unattended cue in Experiment 1. Because we were interested in whether judgments would align with the salient cue, that is, whether behaviors that appear relatively truthful result in more truth ratings, the dependent variable was the proportion of truth judgments.
Results and Discussion
We examined whether focusing on a cue that was more indicative of honesty/deception in the same statement leads to greater/ fewer truth judgments, respectively. We found that truth ratings were dependent on the focal cue. Raters made more truth judgments as the salient cue became more indicative of truth telling (i.e., not thinking hard, or not tense). Specifically, a GLMEM model comparison with random intercepts for participants and stimulus items found the predicted negative effect of focal cue rating, B ϭ Ϫ0.68, 2 (1) ϭ 6.76, p ϭ .009, Figure 3 . When the focal cue was low (not thinking hard/tense, suggestive of honesty), the proportion of truth judgments was relatively high.
On a trial-by-trial basis, the proportion of truth responding was dependent on the focal cue. Those raters attending to an honestyindicative cue were more likely to make truth judgments than those attending to a deception-indicative cue when judging the same statement.
A limitation of this study is that we are unable to localize the effect of focusing. It may be that the truth-lie judgment was being formed while the statement was being delivered, that is, at the same time as they were focusing on the cue. In this case, the focal cue can be said to influence the trajectory of the process. Alternatively, the lie-truth judgment may not begin until the end of the video, after the participant has focused on the cue. In this case, the focal cue would have a biasing effect at the start of the judgment process, acting as an anchor.
Additionally, we intentionally made the focal manipulation as demanding as possible: by having them continuously rate whether the speaker was thinking hard or not, tense or not, moment-bymoment. Although our manipulation resulted in systematic and predicted effects, we did not have a manipulation check and so it is possible that participants did not attend to the cues we asked them to focus on. That we found the predicted effects is certainly suggestive that they focused on the cues we asked them to attend to on a trial-by-trial basis.
General Discussion
Indirect lie detection was hoped to be a promising technique for improving accuracy, one that could be incorporated into police training (see Vrij et al., 2001) . Traditionally, it is claimed that accuracy can only improve if raters can access their inaccessible and unconscious knowledge store (DePaulo, 1994; DePaulo & Morris, 2004) . But we suggested, as others have (Granhag, 2006 ; see also , that the findings from indirect lie detection studies do not align with what is known about implicit, unconscious processes. We went one step further by showing that there is a certain circularity in the logic: The cue is shown to be diagnostic by means of the indirect lie detection method, and then researchers seem surprised that liars and truth-tellers can be distinguished from that cue. From there, the field has retreated to the claim that raters are using hidden, unconscious knowledge.
Our new focal account not only avoids the circularity in logic but also provides a constructive reinterpretation of what the data has so far shown us. The findings of indirect lie detection studies can tell us why explicit lie-truth judgments fare poorly: In making an explicit lie-truth judgment, raters may attempt to integrate a set of unreliable cues that can contradict each other, thereby reducing the joint diagnosticity of the cues. By focusing attention to a smaller set of diagnostic cues, as in the case of the indirect method, the potential for contradiction between the cues used in the judgment is reduced. It leads to what can appear to be an accuracy benefit. It is not the indirect lie detection method that increases accuracy above what is consciously possible, but rather that explicit lie-truth judgments are less accurate than what the rater could potentially achieve if they used solely the more diagnostic information available.
In Experiment 1 we showed that the accuracy of the indirect lie detection method was dependent on the joint diagnosticity of the rated behaviors, and could be explained without recourse to unconscious knowledge. That is, the problem faced by explicit lie This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
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THE FOCAL ACCOUNT detection is also a problem for indirect lie detection. In Experiment 2 we focused the attention of raters onto one of two particular cues within the same statement, and found that explicit lie-truth judgments were swayed on a trial-by-trial basis by the attended behavior, even though there were other behaviors in the statement that contradicted the attended behavior. The positive effects of indirect lie detection were extended to explicit lie detection, again without any recourse to unconscious knowledge. Experiment 2 tested a key prediction of the focal account: whether attending to a given cue can sway the judgment in the direction of that cue. Within the same statement, raters were more or less likely to rater a speaker as a liar depending on whether they were focusing on a behavior rated in a prior study as appearing deceptive or honest, respectively.
The focal account is consistent with decision-making and social attribution research showing that salient information is weighted more heavily in the judgment (Higgins et al., 1977; Moore et al., 2012; Platzer & Bröder, 2012) . It seems the benefit of indirect lie detection is not that it opens a door to additional unconscious knowledge but that it reduces focus to a lesser amount of information.
Our research also speaks to the debate around unconscious thought theory (UTT: Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & Van Baaren, 2006) . UTT proposes that people reason more accurately (e.g., select a car with the better attributes) when thinking unconsciously than consciously. To engage unconscious thinking, participants are given an unrelated distractor task to occupy their conscious mind. The focal account suggests a different interpretation. The distracting task may not engage unconsciousness. Rather, the task may induce a cognitive load. Under load, people are liable to remember only the more central (and potentially more reliable) details of a task, forgetting or ignoring the more peripheral details (e.g., Easterbrook, 1959; Loftus, 1979; Mandler, 1975) , resulting in an unintentional focusing of attention onto fewer cues. Compare this with the claim of the focal account, which suggests accuracy can improve by focusing on fewer diagnostic cues. It is intriguing to consider, as others have argued (Shanks, 2006) , whether the findings supporting UTT actually result from conscious processes.
Note that the TH and TE cues here are latent variables. This means that each is actually an assembly of verbal and nonverbal behaviors that together make a person appear to be thinking hard or tense. These verbal and nonverbal cues might contradict each other too. This may seem problematic for the focal account, but we would argue it is not. There is evidence that people can reliably detect when people are thinking hard and tense (e.g., Cahill et al., 2011; Mann & Vrij, 2006; Vrij et al., 2001) , despite them being a combination of other behaviors. But this does raise the possibility that people are not detecting with the highest possible accuracy just how hard others are thinking. This is because the verbal and nonverbal behaviors making up that latent cue will also have varying levels of diagnosticity. Their joint diagnosticity is the mean of all the individual cues' diagnosticities if they are integrated (assuming a compensatory strategy; see the online supplemental materials for more information about such strategies), not at the rate of the best cue that could be achieved by focusing on the most diagnostic indicator of TH (a noncompensatory strategy). The focal account would predict people can detect whether others are thinking hard best if they use only the most diagnostic cue to TH that is available, and ignore all the other lower diagnostic cues.
An open question concerns how people learn which cues are diagnostic (see Green, Benson, Kersten, & Schrater, 2010 , for more on learning about uncertain information). This is a question beyond the scope of our account, but it seems people do learn them somehow because raters rely more on the diagnostic than the low-diagnostic cues (Hartwig & Bond, 2011) . The issue that lie detectors face once they have learnt the diagnosticities was the concern here: how to effectively reach a judgment. The focal account proposes people integrate them in a compensatory fashion (see the online supplemental materials for further discussion). Unfortunately, explicit lie detectors will end up integrating some diagnostic and some nondiagnostic cues, whereas indirect lie detectors will only integrate those cues that are the subject of focus. In indirect lie detection studies, these are chosen to be diagnostic.
Reviving the Implicit Knowledge Account
In Experiment 1, despite employing the same method other studies have used to supposedly access implicit knowledge, we found that accuracy was dependent on whether or not the cues suggested both contradictory truth and lie judgments. But it might be argued that implicit knowledge is being used to make the indirect lie-truth judgment in our task and that this knowledge fails them when the behaviors being rated contradict one another. The implicit knowledge account has not been articulated at this level, and so it could be made to fit our findings, but we think it less plausible than the account proposed here for three reasons.
First, there is no necessity for the rater to select from their unconscious only the behaviors being explicitly rated. If a rated behavior has low diagnosticity, raters should be able to rely on their implicit knowledge about which cues are diagnostic and use those when making their judgment. Presumably the implicit knowledge store has to have some information about cue diagnosticity if it can increase accuracy beyond a rater's conscious, explicit ability.
Second, the manner in which a judgment is requested from the participant-by indirect response rather than an explicit lie-truth judgment-is the factor that increases accuracy in the implicit knowledge account. It is unimportant whether raters are asked to judge if a person is thinking hard (Vrij et al., 2001) , tense (DePaulo et al., 1982) , ambivalent (DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979) , and so on. The behavior under consideration is seen only as a means of accessing the otherwise hidden implicit knowledge raters supposedly possess. It is the method of indirectly judging that allows access of the implicit knowledge. That one of the arbitrarily selected behaviors happens to have low diagnosticity in our task should have little influence; there is a wealth of verbal and visual information to the implicit mind that can be used instead.
Third, as we have argued throughout, the logic behind the unconscious account is circular. The cue selected for rating in previous research is diagnostic of deception. By definition, the cue will more likely be present when deceiving than telling the truth, or vice versa. The circularity in logic makes it difficult to make any claims about implicit knowledge using this paradigm. the account makes no claims about whether unconscious knowledge can play a role in lie detection. We claim only that the evidence generated by the indirect lie detection literature can be better explained without reference to an unconscious knowledge store and that, instead, it can tell us something interesting about how explicit lie-truth judgments are made.
There are better paradigms to detect implicit knowledge (see Albrechtsen, Meissner, & Susa, 2009; Reinhard, Greifeneder, & Scharmach, 2013 ; although see , for a critical perspective). But it is worth first considering that there have been challenges to the very foundations of these claims: The existence and nature of implicit cognition have been under scrutiny for a long time (Bem, 1972; González-Vallejo, Lassiter, Bellezza, & Lindberg, 2008; James, 1950; Newell & Rakow, 2011; Shanks, 2010; Shanks & St. John, 1994) . For instance, Vadillo, Konstantinidis, and Shanks (2015) have shown through a meta-analysis that an experimental paradigm founded principally on the claim that it accesses unconscious thinking (contextual cueing) can actually be better explained as a conscious process. We take the position of Bem (1972) that we should not make claims to some hidden unconscious mechanism until we can be sure other, simpler explanations do not suffice: ". . . such [unconsciousness] claims can edge dangerously close to metaphysics, and the next retreat into invisibility . . . should surely be resisted mightily until all other alternatives, save angels perhaps, have been eliminated" (p. 52).
Thus, we would caution the practitioner from relying on unconscious inferences based on evidence generated by the indirect lie detection paradigm. Perhaps the largest body of evidence in favor of unconscious benefits for lie detection comes from the use of this indirect lie detection method. The remaining evidence in favor of unconscious benefits to lie detection is limited to a relatively small number of studies employing varying techniques (Albrechtsen et al., 2009; Reinhard et al., 2013; ten Brinke, Stimson, & Carney, 2014) -and the findings have been subject to some criticism . In application, conscious, considered, and verifiable reasoning is encouraged.
The focal account places conscious processing front and center and eschews any reference to a hidden unconscious. As a result, this means there is no requirement for the subtleties that are often used in indirect lie detection: The account argues that raters can be told, that is, be made consciously aware, that their "thinking hard" judgments will be converted into lie-truth judgments. In two experiments, Ulatowska (2014) did just this. She found that the indirect method gives better accuracy rates than direct lie-truth judgments, even when indirect raters are aware that their answers would be inferred as lie-truth judgments.
If we were to try to provide more positive advice for the practitioner, it would be to attempt to rely upon those cues that are more diagnostic in the long run while eschewing those that are nondiagnostic and even those that are low in diagnosticity. Thankfully, there is evidence that people tend to incorporate the more diagnostic cues into their judgments already (Hartwig & Bond, 2011) . But it is likely that low-diagnostic cues are being incorporated also, which may be reducing detection accuracy (e.g., Bond et al., 2013) . There are two general approaches that might be taken. The first is to adapt the environment: either by increasing the quantity and reliability of diagnostic cues or else reducing the availability of low-diagnostic cues. There are a number of techniques suggested by Vrij (e.g., Vrij et al., 2008; see Vrij & Granhag, 2012 , for a view that research should take this direction) that may work to increase the diagnosticity of cues. The second approach is to adapt the rater: to promote reliance on the more diagnostic cues even though there are few of them, and to discourage use of the available low-diagnostic information. This means understanding what cues are likely to have low diagnosticity in a particular setting and to be aware of what information is being incorporated into the judgment. This involves reflecting on one's own thinking strategies, or engaging in "metacognition," so that raters recognize when they are basing their judgments on unreliable cues. Unfortunately relatively little work has explored the role of metacognition in forming lie-truth judgments (although see Ask, Greifeneder, & Reinhard, 2012) .
Note that in most lie detection experiments, participants are expected to make either a lie or truth judgment and are not allowed to abstain. But there are reasons to believe accuracy could increase if raters were able to abstain. In Figure 1 , we show the possible outcomes of making use of two cues in a lie-truth judgment. If raters always abstained from judgment in the case of Figure 1b , where the cues are in conflict, they would only make judgments on those occasions where both cues are complementary and suggest the same outcome. On 45% of all trials, this will give the correct answer. On 10%, this will give the incorrect answer. And on the remaining 45%, raters will make no judgment. Thus accuracy on those trials where a judgment was made will be 82% (.45 correct judgments/.55 all judgments). Unfortunately, this idealized situation is unlikely when making direct lie-truth judgments because there is a wealth of cues available and at least one of them is likely to contradict the other available cues. But when using the indirect method, we might anticipate just such an increase in accuracy.
There is clearly potential for qualitatively different behaviors and pieces of information to have more or less diagnosticity in different contexts. The detail in the information about future plans and intentions is likely more useful for border control officials, but might be unhelpful for deciding if someone had truly been dealt the great poker hand they claim to be holding. Thus, an understanding of the context will ultimately be key for application (see Levine, 2014; Street, 2015) , and will ultimately influence what information is more diagnostic, and thus what information should be attended to. We would recommend waiting for replication of our findings in other labs and a better understanding of which behaviors in a given context are likely to be reliable and consistently diagnostic cues to deception before implementing a focusing method into policy and practice.
Conclusions
We have argued that the higher accuracy found in indirect lie detection studies is not the result of using implicit knowledge. Instead, we suggest accuracy is greater because a single, diagnostic cue is used in the judgment. Direct judgments have a large array of (noisy) behaviors contributing, and raters integrate (at least some of) them to form the judgment. Because the behaviors are noisy, they may contradict each other, thus reducing their joint diagnosticity. We have shown that the indirect lie detection findings can be reinterpreted as a focusing of attention to a small set of diagnostic cues, without the need to make claims about implicit cognition. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
